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Abstract
We consider a linguistically diversified society and examine the notion of language disenfran-
chisement when some individuals are denied the full access to documents and political process
in their native tongues. To calculate the disenfranchisement indices we use the Dyen percentage
cognate matrix of linguistic distances between Indo-European languages and apply survey and
population data on language proficiency in the European Union. We then determine optimal
sets of official languages that depend on society’s sensitivity against disenfranchisement and
comprehensiveness of the chosen language regime. We also discuss the language situation in
the European Union after its last enlargement. (JEL: D70, O52, Z13)
1. Introduction
The challenges of multilingual societies are well documented over the course of
human history. The most famous example is the consequence of the attempt of
the “people” to build a tower in Shinar (Babylonia) to be closer to the sky. God
disliked the idea, descended and “confuse[d] their speech, so that one person
will not understand another’s speech. God scattered them all over the face of
the earth, and they stopped building the city” (Genesis 11, 1–9). The difficulties
in modern societies are by no means smaller, the main reason being that “like
religion, language does not lend itself easily to compromise” (Laponce 1992, pp.
599–600).
In this paper we consider a model of a society where individuals are distin-
guished on the basis of their language characteristics. There is a set of existing
languages and every member of the society is characterized by her language skills
represented by all the languages in which she is proficient. The problem faced by
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the society is to select a subset of languages to be used for translation of official
documents, communication between institutions and citizens, debates in official
bodies, and so forth.
The choice of official languages may have a major impact on the well-being
of some individuals since it will limit their access to laws, rules, and regulations.
In some cases, these limitations could even violate the basic principles of the
society. For example, in the European Union “citizens must be able to take part in
building and maintaining the Union. They have a right to participate on equal terms
and must have access to information and legal texts in their national languages
that affect their lives” (Schaerer 2003). Article 2.11 of the Amsterdam Treaty
allows every citizen of the Union to use his native language in dealing with the
official institutions of the EU. Noninclusion of some languages in the set of the
official ones goes beyond restrictions on the access to information. It may also
alienate groups of individuals whose cultural, societal, and historical values and
sensibilities are not represented by the official languages and consequently create
“language disenfranchisement.” In the context of the European Parliament, “the
right of an elected Member to speak, read, and write in his or her own language lies
in the heart of Parliament’s democratic legitimacy. The case for multilingualism is
based not only on fairness to Members, from whichever country they are elected.
It is necessary to ensure the support of citizens in all Member states; if Parliament
does not recognize their language, it is less likely that citizens will recognize it as
being their Parliament” (see Report of Secretary General, document PE 305.269/
BUR/fin, 2001).
However, the cost of services required to maintain a larger number of official
languages1 languages could be quite substantial. Even before the 2004 enlarge-
ment the institutions of the European Union were the largest recruiter of inter-
preters and translators in the world (Cole and Cole 1997, p. 59). In 1999 the
total translation and interpretation costs for the Commission alone amounted
to 30% of its internal budget (De Swaan 1993; and 2001, p. 172). The basic
principles of political accountability and equality among citizens require that
all, or at least a substantial part of the full-fledged translation services, will
have to be maintained in some of the EU institutions (Council of the European
Union, European Council, European Parliament) (Mamadouh 1995, p. 55–56;
Council of the European Union 2002). Moreover, a failure to provide trans-
lation services by the EU would simply shift the provision of the service to
individual countries, leading to duplications that may raise the total cost of
services (Mamadouh and Hofman 2001), as well as to divergent translations
1. In this paper we use the term “official language” rather than “working language”, but the distinc-
tion between these two concepts in the EU is not very clear. For example, in their first ever passed
Regulation in 1958, the Council of Ministers of the European Community establishes the distinction
between the two but no definition is provided. See Mamadouh (1995, p. 4). Currently, the European
Union has eleven official and working languages, Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German,
Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Swedish, and one treaty language, Irish.
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and interpretations. The burden of maintaining official languages is not limited to
direct costs of translation and interpretation. Communication (De Swaan 2001,
p. 173) constitutes an even more serious challenge in societies with a large number
of official languages. Translation and interpretation errors as well as the delays
caused by translations may end up paralyzing multilateral discussions and negoti-
ations (Mamadouh 1998, p. 8). But more importantly, language is so much associ-
ated to local culture that large subsets of the population may become, at best, insen-
sitive, at worst opposed to the political process. As Bretton (1976, p. 447) points
out: “Language may be the most explosive issue universally and over time. This
mainly because language alone, unlike all other concerns associated with nation-
alism and ethnocentrism . . . is so closely tied to the individual self. Fear of being
deprived of communicating skills seem to rise political passion to a fever pitch.”
Unless the set of official languages includes all languages, a linguistically
diversified society is bound to face some degree of language disenfranchisement.
An important feature of our analysis is that an individual derives her degree
of disenfranchisement over the set of official languages as a whole, rather than
dissecting it into preferences over single languages and we define the preferences
of every member of the society over all subsets of languages. This has important
implications on the selection of optimal sets of official languages. For example,
there are more citizens in the EU who speak German than French. However,
this fact alone does not necessarily support the choice of German over French
as one of the official languages. Indeed, the number of EU citizens who speak
both English and French is larger than the number of those who speak English
and German. Thus, preferences over larger sets of languages, especially those
including English, could be more relevant and informative than preferences over
single languages.
We calculate disenfranchisement using two alternative methods. One is di-
chotomous: An individual is disenfranchised if she speaks no official language;
she is not if she speaks at least one official language. This assumption can be
challenged: If an individual does not speak any official language, some of them
may have common roots with her native tongue that would reduce the degree of her
disenfranchisement. Indeed, consider a citizen who speaks only Portuguese and
compare her attitude towards two potential sets of official languages, containing
respectively Spanish or German. Even though our Portuguese citizen speaks none
of these, given the cultural and linguistic proximity of Portuguese and Spanish,
the degree of her linguistic disenfranchisement will be lower if Spanish rather
than German is chosen as one of the official languages. This leads to what we call
the Dyen2 disenfranchisement index.
2. The term refers to Isidore Dyen who led the research for collecting the data and for computing
such distances.
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Both indices can be computed using two basic data sets on the number of
people who do (or do not) speak languages. First, we compute disenfranchisement
indices and optimal language sets using country populations and their native lan-
guage only. To account for multilingual citizens, we also use surveys on language
proficiency in each country.
We also examine optimal sets of official languages, which are determined
by two parameters. One is the sensitivity of the society towards language disen-
franchisement of its members. The other is the degree of comprehensiveness of
its language regime, which can take any intermediate form between the follow-
ing two polar cases. Under full interpretation all documents and discussions in
meetings are translated into all languages. Under minimal interpretation, noth-
ing is translated. In practice, the language regime is chosen somewhere between
these two extremes. This is already the case in the European Union today, where
only some documents are translated into all official languages and the discus-
sions (and translations) in several elected bodies are limited to a small number of
languages.
There are other examples: (a) In the European Court of Justice the language of
the hearings is chosen by the defendant (among 11 official languages plus Irish)
at beginning of the procedure, and the proceedings are translated into French,
the permanent working language of the Court; (b) Even though the Commission
publishes its official documents in all official languages, its internal working lan-
guages are French and English, and to a lesser extent German. See Mamadouh
(1998, p. 5); (c) It is often suggested to use some pivotal languages in the Parlia-
ment, to which and from which all other languages that are used in the Parliament
will be translated.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss our model and
introduce language disenfranchisement indices. Section 3 is devoted to the two
important special cases of disenfranchisement indices based on distances between
languages: dichotomous disenfranchisement and Dyen disenfranchisement. In
Section 4, we compute our indices and show that they lead to similar results. The
two main groups of European languages (Latin and Germanic) have to be repre-
sented in order to reduce disenfranchisement in the EU15. We extend our analysis
to the Union after the enlargement using the population based disenfranchisement
indices. In Section 5, we derive the optimal sets of official languages for different
values of sensitivity towards language disenfranchisement and comprehensive-
ness of the language regime. We show that the introduction of the Dyen matrix of
linguistic distances has a major impact on our results. In particular, it highlights
the importance of Latin languages, such as French, Spanish, or Italian. It may
come as a surprise that the pair of two major European languages, English and
German, generates more disenfranchisement than Spanish and Dutch. The reason
is that proximity dominates the effect of number of native speakers, as in the case
of the linguistic closeness of French, Italian, and Portuguese to Spanish, and of
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Dutch to German. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks. The theoretical
derivations utilized in Section 4 are presented in the Appendix.
2. The Model
We consider a society N that consists of n members,3 who speak different lan-
guages from a given set L = {1, . . . , L}. For every individual i ∈ N we denote
by P(i) the subset of languages in L spoken by i.4
Given a set of official languages T , those members of the society who speak
no language from T will be disenfranchised. However, an empty intersection of
the sets P(i) and T may be insufficient to determine the degree of disenfranchise-
ment of individual i. As alluded to in the introduction, a unilingual Portuguese
speaker who speaks neither German nor Spanish may prefer the set which con-
tains Spanish. To account for this possibility, we introduce the distance function
, defined over pairs of subsets of languages, where (S, S′) indicates how “lin-
guistically close” the sets S and S′ are. Thus, for every set of languages T , the
value (P (i), T ), the distance between the set of languages P(i) spoken by i and
the set T , will be considered as a degree of (individual) language disenfranchise-
ment of individual i. Thus, if the set T is chosen as the set of official languages,
the aggregate disenfranchisement index, D(T ), is defined by:
D(T ) =
∑
i∈N
(P (i), T ).
Note that for every distance function , the disenfranchisement index D de-
creases if the set of official languages expands:
T ⊂ S → D(T ) > D(S),
where T ⊂ S means that the set T is contained in the set S and is different from
S. That is, a more inclusive set of official languages reduces disenfranchisement.
Thus, if the reduction of disenfranchisement is the only goal of the society, the
entire set of languages L would be the unambiguous choice. In this case only
individuals who speak no language in Lwould contribute to disenfranchisement.
However, cost considerations for maintaining official languages make the choice
of the optimal set more complicated. Denote by C(T ) the cost of maintaining the
3. We use the word “society” here in order to encompass communities, regions, countries, conti-
nents, or any other political and geographical structure.
4. We do not distinguish here between native and nonnative tongues, and, more generally, we do
not introduce the degree of command of a certain language, which is anyway very difficult to assess.
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set T of official languages and assume that the cost function increases if the set
of official languages expands:
T ⊂ S → C(T ) < C(S).
Thus, there is a trade-off between disenfranchising citizens and the translation,
interpretation, and communication costs generated by a large number of lan-
guages. Formally, the society’s objective is to find a set of languages T that
minimizes the weighted sum of the total disenfranchisement index D(T ) and
the cost C(T ):
min
T ⊂LαD
(T ) + C(T )
where the positive parameter α represents the society’s “sensitivity” parameter
attached to members’ disenfranchisement.5
Let us turn to a brief examination of the cost function. There are cases in
which the proper functioning of official institutions becomes impractical if too
many languages are used. Imagine a meeting where every participant speaks his
own language without being understood by the majority of other participants. This
generates a cost function whose values are prohibitively high if the number of
official languages exceeds a certain threshold. But even if this is not the case, the
total cost of sustaining several languages depends on the nature of the language
regime imposed by the society. Assume that there is a fixed cost c generated by
translation, interpretation, communication, and printing of all documents between
any two official languages and that there is a uniform stream of demands from
all languages. Under a “full interpreting regime” that requires every important
document to exist in all official languages, the total cost of sustaining k languages
would be given by ck2. If the society adopts a “minimal standard interpreting
regime,” that requires no translation into any other official language, the total cost
of sustaining k languages will be ck. The society can also adopt an “intermediate
standard interpreting regime,” in which case the cost would take values ckβ ,
where 1 < β < 2. To accommodate various language regimes, we assume
that C(T ) = c|T |β , where |T | stands for the cardinality of the set T , and the
parameter β (1 ≤ β ≤ 2) represents the degree of comprehensiveness of the
language regime, including two polar cases β = 1 and β = 2. Without loss of
generality, we set c = 1. Then the society’s problem is to choose T that solves
min
T ⊂LG
(T , α, β) (1)
5. See also Grin (2003) who argues that there must be an optimum, since “it is reasonable to assume
that the benefits of diversity increase at a decreasing rate, while its costs increase at an increasing
rate.” As one of the referees has suggested, along these lines one can introduce a societal objective
function that is strictly concave, rather than linear, in D(T ). In our attempt to keep this analysis as
simple as possible, we leave this extension to the future research.
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where
G(T , α, β) ≡ αD(T ) + |T |β. (2)
The following proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 1. (i) The function G(T , α, ·) is increasing in β for every T
and α. That is, raising the standard of the interpreting regime increases soci-
ety’s language costs. (ii) The function G(T , ·, β) is increasing in α for every T
and β.
For every α and β, let the solutions of problem (1) be denoted by T (α, β) and
assume that they are well defined. We have the following observation:
Proposition 2. There exists α∗ such that T (α, β) = L for every 1 ≤ β ≤ 2
whenever α > α∗. That is, if the society exhibits a sufficiently high degree of
intolerance to disenfranchisement, no language should be excluded from the list
of official languages.
Note that the second term in equation (2) depends only on the number of languages
in T . Thus, if the examination is restricted to sets of languages that consist of
k ≤ L elements, the task is reduced to identifying those k languages that minimize
disenfranchisement.6 Indeed, let k be given. Denote
T k = arg min|T |=k D
(T ).
Then the optimal set T (α, β) is determined by:
T (α, β) = arg min
k=1,...,LG
(T k , α, β).
In the next section we investigate the solutions of problem (1).
3. Dichotomous and Dyen Disenfranchisement Indices
Let us assume that for any two sets of languages S and S′, the distance function
(S, S′) takes values between 0 and 1 and that (S, S′) = 0 only if S and S′
contain a common language. If either S or S′ is empty, we set (S, S′) = 1. We
consider two special cases.
6. This is what Van Parijs (2003) calls “the principle of minimal exclusion” for single languages.
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3.1. Dichotomous Case
Here the value of the distance function, denoted d(S, T ), is equal to 1 for every
two sets S and S′ with an empty intersection. That is,
d(S, S′) =
{
0 if S⋂ S′ = ∅
1 if S⋂ S′ = ∅.
Given the set of official languages T , the only factor in determining the degree
of disenfranchisement of individual i is whether she speaks a language from T
or not, and no consideration is given to languages that i does not speak. This
formulation leads to a dichotomous disenfranchisement index, denoted Dd(T ),
which represents the number of members who do not speak a language in T :
Dd(T ) =
∑
{i∈N :P(i)⋂ T =∅}
1.
3.2. Dyen Case
If an individual speaks at least one official language, she is not disenfranchised,
that is, the degree of her disenfranchisement is equal to zero. However, if she
speaks none of the official languages, her degree of disenfranchisement may
depend on the linguistic proximity between the set of languages that she speaks
and the set of official languages. To account for this important feature, we consider
the linguistic function y , derived from the matrix of “percentage cognate” Indo-
European languages constructed by Dyen, Kruskal, and Black (1992).7 The matrix
consists of the distances y(l,m) between any two languages (l, m) ∈ L. They
take values between 0 and 1, with y(l,m) = 0 if and only if l = m. For two sets S
and S′, the value of the linguistic distance function y(S, S′) is then determined
as the minimal distance between languages in S and T :
y(S, T ) = min
l∈S,m∈T y(l,m).
The corresponding Dyen disenfranchisement index Dy(T ) is the sum of Dyen
distances between the language sets P(i) of all members of the society and the
set of official languages T :
Dy(T ) =
∑
{i∈N :P(i)⋂ T =∅}
y(P (i), T ).
Since for every i who speaks a language that belongs to T , the linguistic distance
y(P (i)),(T ) is equal to zero, it follows that the Dyen index is, in fact, the sum
7. This matrix is actually the inverse to the resemblance function of Greenberg (1956).
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Table 1. Disenfranchisement indices.
Dichotomous Dyen
Survey-based data Dds Dys
Population-based data Ddp Dyp
of the Dyen linguistic distances between the set T and the language sets P(i) for
all those individuals who speak no language from T . This is in contrast to the
dichotomous index that counts them as one.
4. Computing Disenfranchisement Indices
The disenfranchisement indices Dd and Dy are computed by using two sets of
data. The first is a survey on language proficiency. Since some doubt is often cast
on such surveys, we also calculate two indices with respect to native populations of
each country. In the latter case we assume, for simplicity, that the entire population
of each country (or region, as in the case of Belgium) speaks its unique official
language. Our derivations lead to four indices exhibited in Table 1.
4.1. Survey-Based Disenfranchisement
In 2000, the Directorate of Education and Culture of the European Union ordered
a survey on languages, that was conducted by INRA (2000). In each of the 15 then-
members of the EU, 1,000 interviews8 were conducted on the use of languages.
The information used in this paper is derived from answers to the following two
questions:
(a) What is your mother tongue? (note to the interviewer: do not probe; do not
read [the list of languages] out; if bilingual, state both languages);
(b) What other languages do you know? (show card (containing a list of lan-
guages)9 read out; multiple answers possible).
There were four possible choices for (b). We assumed that the first two choices
that came to the mind of the person interviewed were the languages that she knew
best. There were also questions on whether the knowledge of the language was
“very good,” “good,” or “basic,” but we did not take these answers into account,
since such qualifications are usually very subjective, vary across individuals, and
are therefore not very informative.10
8. With some minor variations: 1,300 interviews in the UK, 2,000 in Germany, and 600 in
Luxembourg.
9. Danish, German, French, Italian, Dutch, English, Spanish, Portuguese, Greek, Irish, Swedish,
Finnish, Luxembourgish (one of the official languages of Luxembourg), Arabic, Turkish, Chinese,
Sign language, Other (specify first and second), and None.
10. The examination of language knowledge in this type of surveys is open to a criticism. Nonnative
speakers of a language do not use the right idiomatic expressions, mistranslate, misinterpret the real
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Table 2. Number of EU citizens who know only 1, 2, or 3
languages in L.
Languages No. of speakers Languages No. of speakers
(in millions) (in millions)
E 58.7 EGF 19.2
G 40.9 EGI 2.1
F 35.4 EGS 2.0
I 27.1 EGD 7.9
S 22.4 EFI 11.5
D 4.2 EFS 13.3
EFD 4.4
EG 37.9 EIS 1.5
EF 24.7 EID 0.3
EI 11.4 ESD 0.1
ES 10.8 GFI 1.0
ED 2.8 GFS 0.6
GF 2.2 GFD 2.0
GI 0.9 GIS 0.1
GS 0.5 GID ng
GD 1.1 GSD ng
FI 7.8 FIS 0.8
FS 3.6 FID 0.1
FD 1.1 FSD 0.1
IS 0.4 ISD ng
ID ng
SD ng
Notes: “ng” means less than 0 05 million E = English, F = French, G = German, I =
Italian, S = Spanish, and D = Dutch
In order to derive disenfranchisement indices, we need some notation. For
every subset T of the set of languages L, we denote by nE(T ) the number of
individuals who speak all languages in T and no other language:
nE(T ) = |{i ∈ N : P(i) = T }|.
However, the survey results are given in terms of the number of individuals,
denoted by nA(T ), who speak all the languages in T and, possibly, some others:
nA(T ) = |{i ∈ N : T ⊆ P(i)}|.
Obviously, for every T , the inequality nE(T ) ≤ nA(T ) holds. The derivation of
the values nE(T ) from those of nA(T ) is presented in the Appendix.
To adjust the survey results to our framework, we consider the setN of the resi-
dents of the European Union, and restrict our attention to the setL of six languages
meaning of words or sentences (Piron 1994, p. 67). To be known, a language needs 12,000 hours
of study and practice (Piron 1994, p. 79) and a survey like the one we use certainly exaggerates
the number of people who speak the language in some depth. Our argument for using the survey is
twofold. First, it contains numbers, which are better than the usual guesswork on which discussions
on knowledge of languages and the decisions that may follow, are based (Fettes 1991, Piron 1994,
p. 69, and Crystal 1997, p. 55–61). Second, this is the most complete and recent data set that exists,
and unless one has 15,000 people taking linguistic exams in several languages, it will be difficult to
do any better.
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Table 3. The Dyen matrix of linguistic distances.
Dk D E F G Gr I Po S Sw
Dk 0 0.337 0.407 0.759 0.293 0.817 0.737 0.750 0.750 0.126
D 0.337 0 0.392 0.756 0.162 0.812 0.740 0.747 0.742 0.308
E 0.407 0.392 0 0.764 0.422 0.838 0.753 0.760 0.760 0.411
F 0.759 0.756 0.764 0 0.756 0.843 0.197 0.291 0.291 0.756
G 0.293 0.162 0.422 0.756 0 0.812 0.735 0.753 0.747 0.305
Gr 0.817 0.812 0.838 0.843 0.812 0 0.822 0.833 0.833 0.816
I 0.737 0.740 0.753 0.197 0.735 0.822 0 0.227 0.212 0.741
Po 0.750 0.747 0.760 0.291 0.753 0.833 0.227 0 0.126 0.742
S 0.750 0.742 0.760 0.291 0.747 0.833 0.212 0.126 0 0.747
Sw 0.126 0.308 0.411 0.756 0.305 0.816 0.741 0.742 0.747 0
Notes: Since Finnish is not a Indo-European language, it is not included here Given the linguistic remoteness of Finnish,
its Dyen distance to every language in the table was set equal to 1 Dk = Danish, D = Dutch, E = English, F = French,
G = German, Gr = Greek, It = Italian, Po = Portuguese, S = Spanish, and Sw = Swedish
This matrix is based on cognate data collected by Isidore Dyen in the 1960s (see IE-DATA1 〈at www
ntu edu au/education/langs/ielex/IE-DATA1〉) For each entry from the list of 200 basic meanings selected by Swadesh
(1952), and Dyen, Kruskal, and Black (1992) see collected the words used in 95 Indo-European speech varieties (lan-
guages and dialects) and classified these into cognate classes For a given meaning, such a class contains all the words
from different speech varieties, that have an unbroken history of descent from a common ancestral word An entry of this
matrix is equal to nlm/(n0lm + nlm), the “ percentage cognate” between languages l and m, where nlm is the number of
meanings for which l and m are classified as “cognate” and n0lm is the number of meanings for which the speech varieties
l and m are “not cognate ” (The number of “doubtfully cognate” meanings does not enter into the calculation of such
percentages) Note that the higher this number, the more “similar” the two languages Since we use a “distance” matrix,
it is more convenient to consider the “percentage of not cognate,” y(l,m) = n0lm/(n0lm + nlm) The diagonal elements
y(l, l) are set to zero
most widely spoken in the EU before the enlargement: Dutch, English, French,
German, Italian, and Spanish. To simplify, we disregard the small group of indi-
viduals who know four or more languages and assume thatnE(T ) = nA(T ) = 0 if
the set T contains more than three languages. By using the derivations relegated to
the Appendix, we obtain the values of the functions nE(·) given in Table 2. These
values allow for the direct derivation of the dichotomous disenfranchisement
indices Dds (T ) (Stroobants 2002; Ginsburgh and Weber forthcoming). More-
over, combining them with the Dyen distance matrix, given in Table 3, Dyen
disenfranchisement indices Dys (T ) can be easily computed. (Both indices Dds
and Dys are given in Table 4.)
4.2. Population-Based Disenfranchisement
Here we take the extreme assumption that only those citizens who live in a country
speak its native language. It is quite obvious that this assumption will negatively
affect native languages in less populated countries, and favor native languages in
larger countries.11 Both sets of indices Ddp and Dyp are presented in Table 4.
It is worthwhile to extend the examination of population-based indices for
the ten countries that have joined the Union on May 1, 2004. Detailed results are
11. English, for example, is the native language of 62.3 million inhabitants (58.6 in the United
Kingdom and 3.7 in Ireland), while German is spoken by 90.1 native speakers (82 million Germans
and 8.1 million Austrians). Even French is the native language of more citizens than English (60.4
million Frenchman and 4 million French-speaking Belgians).
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Table 5. Dichotomous and Dyen population-based disenfranchisement indices in EU 25, for
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 languages in L.
Languages Ddp Dyp Languages Ddp Dyp Languages Ddp Dyp
E 377 245 EGF 223 94 EGFI 165 79
G 349 224 EGI 229 92 EGFS 183 81
F 375 224 EGS 248 100 EGFD 201 90
I 382 225 EGD 265 194 EGIS 190 82
S 400 235 EFI 255 125 EGID 201 89
D 424 235 EFS 273 127 EGSD 226 96
EFD 291 106 EFIS 216 115
EG 287 198 EIS 280 128 EFID 233 91
EF 313 140 EID 297 104 EFSD 251 93
EI 319 138 ESD 316 112 EISD 258 95
ES 338 145 GFI 227 106 GFIS 188 96
ED 355 210 GFS 245 108 GFID 205 100
GF 285 120 GFD 263 115 GFSD 223 102
GI 292 118 GIS 252 109 GISD 230 104
GS 310 126 GID 270 113 FISD 256 106
GD 327 218 GSD 288 121
FI 317 212 FIS 278 109 EGFIS 126 70
FS 336 217 FID 295 116 EGFID 143 76
FD 353 131 FSD 314 118 EGFSD 161 78
IS 342 216 ISD 320 119 EGISD 168 79
ID 360 129 EFISD 194 82
SD 378 136 GFISD 166 91
EGFISD 104 66
Notes: E = English, F = French, G = German, I = Italian, S = Spanish, and D = Dutch
provided in Table 5. German comes out as optimal choice if only one language is
retained, but English and Italian are very close competitors. For three languages,
the choice English–French–German is again optimal (or second-best), though the
triples English–German–Italian or French–German–Italian are close substitutes.
5. Optimal Choices of Official Languages: Empirical Analysis and
Discussion
Since for given number of official languages k, given value of society’s sensitivity
to disenfranchisement α, and its degree of the language interpreting regime β, the
solutions of the minimization problem (1) depend on disenfranchisement indices
only, we can derive optimal sets T k in Table 6 by using the data from Table 4.
It turns out that survey-based dichotomous and Dyen first-best choices coincide.
English is obvious if society restricts its choice to a single official language.
If two languages are chosen, then the second language should be reasonably
distant from the first and known by a reasonably large number of nonnatives.
Therefore English–French is also an obvious choice, though Italian and Spanish
13
Table 6. Optimal languages sets in EU15.
Number of languages
One Two Three Four Five Six
First best choices
Dichotomous survey-based E EF EFG EFGI EFGIS EFGISD
169 114 70 43 20 16
Dyen survey-based E EF EFG EFGI∗ EFGIS EFGISD
108 40 20 13 8 7
Dichotomous population-based G GF EFG EFGI EFGIS EFGISD
286 222 160 102 63 41
Dyen population-based I GI EGI EFGI EFGIS EFGISD
177 71 45 32 22 19
Second best choices
Dichotomous survey-based F EG EGI EGFS EGFID
250 119 83 48 39
Dyen survey-based G EI EGI EGIS EGFID†
142 41 21 15 13
Dichotomous population-based F EG FGI EGFS EGFID
312 224 164 120 80
Dyen population-based G FG EFG EFGS EFGID
182 73 46 34 29
Notes: ∗Ties with EFGS
†Ties with EGSFD
come close to French. The successive optimal choices (if society opts to go to
three, four, five, and six languages) oscillate between a Germanic and a Latin
language. For three, German is added, then Italian (or Spanish, which ties with
Italian), then Spanish (or Italian), not because of their linguistic proximity, but
because they are spoken by more citizens than Dutch, and finally, Dutch. It is also
interesting to examine second-best choice sets, i.e., those with the second-lowest
values of the indices. Under dichotomous disenfranchisement, the pairs English–
French and English–German are very close. The Dyen index makes the choices
English–French, English–Italian, and English–Spanish almost identical; and so
are the triples English–French–German, English–Italian–German and English–
Spanish–German.
As expected, population-based optimal sets are different. Indeed, English
loses its lead, since German and French are spoken by more natives than English,
and Italian and Spanish are linguistically closer than English and German.12
However, if the Union settles for three working languages, English, French, and
German are the first-best choices according to three criteria, and is second-best
according to the Dyen population-based criterion. Note, however, that French
12. The Dyen distance between Italian and Spanish is 0.212, while it is 0.422 between English and
German. See Table 3.
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Figure 1. Survey-based dichotomous optimal sets: E.U. 15.
could be replaced by Italian or Spanish without substantially altering the level of
disenfranchisement.13
English–French–German is the group of languages that the European Com-
mission uses currently (though German is used to a lesser extent), and these will
probably be the pivotal languages, to which and from which other languages
will be translated. Our results show that this is indeed the optimal choice. Since
Spanish is widely spoken in some regions outside of the EU, it could, for that
reason, serve as a serious alternative to French, even though French is optimal
within the European Union.14 This shows that when distances between languages
are accounted for, the balance shifts towards Latin languages, providing a strong
argument against English as a unique lingua franca.
Figures 1–6 illustrate the sets of optimal languages T d (α, β) and T y(α, β),
respectively, for all values of α and β. The darkest area in the left of each figure
represents the pairs (α, β), for which only one language (English) is chosen as
13. The results would remain almost the same if we consider the EU after the enlargement. The only
difference is that instead of Italian and German being first and second best single choices according
to the Dyen-population index before the enlargement, German and French lead the way.
14. French is used worldwide by 169 million people, Italian, by 70 million, and Spanish
by 450 million. For Spanish see Dalby (2002, p. 31). For French, which is also the lingua
franca in most West African countries, see 〈http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/francophonie/francais/
carte.html〉, the web site of the French diplomatic service. Dalby’s estimate (p. 31) is some-
what lower (130 million people “use French”). For Italian, the number comes from 〈http://www.
ethnologue.com/show language.asp?code=ITN〉 (or DUT).
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Figure 2. Survey-based Dyen optimal sets: E.U. 15.
the official language. The next areas to the right represent the sets of (α, β)-
values for which two, three, four, or five languages are optimal according to the
criterion considered. Finally, in the white area, all six languages are needed. As
the figures show, sensitivity to disenfranchisement (α) has to be very low in order
Figure 3. Population-based dichotomous optimal sets: E.U. 15.
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Figure 4. Population-based Dyen optimal sets: E.U. 15.
to sustain a unique official language for all types of interpreting regimes (β). In
general, the set of optimal languages expands under higher values of sensitivity
to disenfranchisement and shrinks under a higher degree of comprehensiveness
of the language regime.
Figure 5. Population-based dichotomous optimal sets: E.U. 25.
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Figure 6. Population-based Dyen optimal sets: E.U. 25.
6. Conclusions
Our results show that it could be unwise to select English only as the working
language, not only because it is not always optimal, but also because it is optimal
only for very small values of the coefficient that represents sensitivity to disen-
franchisement. What is remarkable, however, is that whatever index is chosen,
the best choice of three languages is English, French, and German, though Italian
could be a very reasonable substitute to French. This is so for the EU before and
after the 2004 enlargement. Spanish is obviously not a good choice within the EU
if no account is taken of Mexico and Latin America, and the growing importance
of Spanish in the South and Western United States. It may therefore be reasonable
for the EU to adopt four working languages, three of which (English, French, and
German) for general use, while Spanish is added for its importance in the rest of
the world.
Appendix
The following useful result allows us to derive the values nE(T ) from those of
nA(T ).
Proposition 3. For every T ⊂ L we have
nE(T ) = nA(T ) −
L−|T |∑
k=1
∑
S∈LT|T |+k
(−1)knA(S) (A.1)
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where for every integer k, |T | ≤ k ≤ L, LTk denotes the set of all subsets of L
that consist of k elements and contain the set T .
Proof. Let individual i be such that there is a setS ∈ LT|T |+k such thatS ⊂ P(i). If
k = 0 then i is included once on both sides of equation (A.1). If k > 0, then i does
not appear on the left side of (A.1), but is included (1−(k1)+(k2)−· · ·+(−1)k(kk))
times15 which completes the proof of the proposition.
Since we ignore those individuals who speak at least four languages, equation
(A.1) implies that for every i, j, k ∈ L
nE({i}) = nA({i}) −
∑
T ∈L{i}2
nA(T ) +
∑
T ∈L{i}3
nA(T ),
nE({i, j}) = nA({i, j}) −
∑
T ∈L{i,j}3
nA(T ),
nE({i, j, k}) = nA({i, j, k}).
The values nE are presented in Table 2.
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